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II.

ARGUMENT IN REPLY

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE HEARING OFFICER'S
DETERMINATION THAT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS LEGAL CAUSE FOR
THE STOP WHEN THE HEARING OFFICER MADE A CLEARLY ERRONEOUS RULING,
IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
A.

Introduction
Appellant, Mark Paradis (hereinafter "Mr. Paradis") argues the district court erred when it

concluded that there was substantial and competent evidence to support the hearing ot1icer's
determination that Deputy Hoodman possessed legal cause to stop Mr. Paradis where Deputy
Hoodman's testimony as to Mr. Paradis's driving pattern differed from both Mr. and Mrs. Paradis.
The hearing ofliccr denied all questioning into Deputy Hoodman •s previous employment history and
any '·personnel matters". Deputy Hoodman's credibility is directly at issue here because the majority
of testimony supports Mr. Paradis's contention that he did not drive in a manner contrary to law. Due
to the hearing officer's outright denial as to any questioning of Deputy Hoodman's "personnel
matters" it is impossible for the record to reflect what credibility Deputy Hoodman has, or the lack
thereof. This outright refusal to question clearly relevant information is clearly erroneous and directly
violates Mr. Paradis' constitutional right to due process. Specifically, the hearing officer prevented
Paradis from discussing how Deputy 1-loodman perjured himself in his sworn statement which was
used by the hearing officer to conclude there was legal cause to justify the stop of Mr. Paradis, as
well as any other information regarding "personnel matters" including the Deputy's training, as well
as previous experiences including what led Deputy Hoodman to leave his previous employment as
a law enforcement officer.

In response, Idaho State Department of Transportation (hereinafter "ITO") argues that the
hearing officer's decision is based on sufficient evidence in the record and that Deputy Hoodman •s
previous training and experience is not relevant. A review of the record and relevant case law reveals
that ITD's argument fails and that the district court erred in affirming the hearing officer's
determination.
B.

Mark Paradis Established that Questions relating to Dcputv Hoodman's Credibilitv Are
Necessarv For His ALS Defense And The Hearing Officer's Denial Into Such An lnguirv as
Irrelevant Is Clearlv Erroneous. Arbitrarv. and Capricious
The district court was required to reverse and remand the order of Hearing Officer Eric

Moody because the refusal as to any inquiry into "personnel matters" of the arresting officer is
clearly erroneous. ITO argues in their responsive brief that the Hearing officer was not arbitrary and
capricious in ruling that Deputy Hoodman's work history based on this record is not relevant,
however based on the record and prior case law, ITD's position is incorrect. Respondent's Briefp.

I 8.
In Gibbar, the Idaho Court of Appeals Construed Idaho Code 18-8002A(7)(d), requiring
alcohol concentration test be conducted according to statutory requirements, as "permitting ALS
petitioners to challenge the results of their BAC test. ... ". !11 re Suspension cl/Driver's License of

Gihhar, 143 Idaho 937,947, 155 P.3d 1176, 1186 (Ct. App. 2006). Similarly, Idaho Code 188002A(7)(a) provides petitioners with a defense that the peace officer did not have legal cause to
stop the petitioner. Idaho Code§ l 8-8002A(7)( a). Accordingly, petitioners are permitted to challenge
the sufficiency as to the legal cause for the stop.

2

As stated in Gibbar, "[f]or the purpose of determining whether reasonable suspicion existed
to conduct a traffic stop, an officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or her
possession, and those inferences may be drawn from the ofricer's experience and law enforcement
training.'' Gibbw-, 143 Idaho at 943, 155 P.3d at I 182 (Ct. App. 2006)(citingS/a/e v. i\Jontague, 114
Idaho 3 I 9,321, 756 P.2d I 083, 1085 (Ct.App. 1988)). In the cun-ent case Deputy Hoodman used his
training and experience in surmising that "[Mr. Paradis'] tires would go into the grass and kick up
dirt because he was actually leaving the roadway partially." Tr. ALS p. 54 LL.19-22. This is just one
example of Deputy 1-loodman drawing upon his experience and training in law enforcement to draw
reasonable inferences from facts in his possession to justify the stop of Mr. Paradis' vehicle. As such,
an inquiry into the sufficiency of his training and previous experiences is necessary to determine the
adequacy of such inferences.
Mr. and Mrs. Paradis both testified that Mr. Paradis never drove off of the road at any point.
Tr. ALS p. 72 LL. 19-20. However, Deputy Hoodman contradicted this testimony stating that Mr.
Paradis drove off the road and kicked up dirt at some point during the 20 minutes Deputy Hoodman
followed Mr. Paradis without pulling him over. Tr. ALS p. 54 LL. 19-22. Because Deputy Hoodman
failed to record any part of him following Mr. Paradis's vehicle, the oral testimony along with the
Deputy's sworn statement is the only evidence relied upon to justify legal cause for the stop.
Findings of Fact, 1.10. Thus the credibility of the witnesses is of the utmost importance. However,
when Mr. Paradis began to inquire into Deputy Hoodman's credibility, by discussing his previous
employment, the Hearing Officer stated "personnel matters" were not relevant to the "ALS process".
Tr. ALS p. 33 LL. 6-21.
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I.

Because challenging the legal cause to a stop is a permitted defense under l 88002(A)(7). information related to Deputv Hoodman's credibilitv is clearlv relevant
when the Deputv's testimonv is the sole piece of evidence justifving the stop

The hearing officer's outright denial to allow Mr. Paradis to conduct a line of questioning
into what the hearing officer characterized as "personnel matters" is clearly erroneous. If a Defendant
has the right to present a defense at an ALS hearing, a holding by the Hearing Officer that all
information related to that defense is not clearly relevant is clearly erroneous. Bell v. Idaho Trans.

Dept. 151 ldaho 659,667,262 P.3d 1030, 1038 (Ct. App. 2011). In Bell, the defendant requested
multiple subpoenas including for the relevant officer's certification card showing he was certified
on the evidentiary machine used on Bell. The court there held that
"[ w ]hile the hearing of1icer denied Bell's subpoena request to obtain the officer's
certification, several of Bell's other requests were granted. As such, the hearing
officer recognized that it had discretion to grant or deny Bell's requests. In denying
Bell's request, the hearing officer determined that the officer's certification card was
not clearly relevant. That determination was premised upon the fact that Officer
White had already submitted a sworn affidavit indicating that his certification expired
in December 2010. Had !he hearing officer de/ermined Iha/ any information
regarding Officer White's certification was not clearly relevant, the hearing officer's
conclusion would have been clearly erroneous."
Id. (Emphasis added).

Because the hearing officer forbid any questioning related to "personnel matters" Mr. Paradis
was denied the ability to question the training and experience that formed the basis of "reasonable
inferences" used to justify the stop of Mr. Paradis.
This training includes studying and applying the standards of the National Highway Traffic
and Safety Administration, of which the Hearing Officer took notice of at the hearing. Tr. ALS p.
IO LL. 11-17. As stated in the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration training manual,
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the field sohriety tests given to Mr. Paradis arc explicitly stated to not be "pass/fail tests". DWI

Detection and Standardized Field Sobriety Testing (SFST) Participant Manual: Last Revised:
10/2015. However, in Deputy Hoodman's sworn statement he states that Mr. Paradis "failed" all
three of the field sobriety tests that were administered. R. Ex. 5 pp.132-l 34. It is impossible for Mr.
Paradis to fail any of these tests as they are explicitly stated to not be "pass/foil" tests. This is one
example clearly showing Deputy Hoodman's lack of training, which goes directly to Deputy
Hoodman's credibility, and which Mr. Paradis was forbidden from presenting because of the Hearing
Oflicer's erroneous and arbitrary ruling that Deputy Hoodman·s personnel matters were not a "part
of the ALS process:·
In Bell the court held if the Hearing Officer found that any information regarding the
Officer's certification was not clearly relevant, the hearing officer's conclusion would have been
clearly erroneous because a challenge to the Officer's certification is be a defense to the ALS
suspension. Bell, l 5 l Idaho at 667.
Herc, the hearing officer found that all "personnel matters" were not relevant to the ALS
hearing. Tr. ALS p. 33 6-2 l. However, the training and past work experience is certainly relevant
to the issue of Deputy Hoodman's credibility. Additionally, the oral testimony and sworn statements
of Deputy Hoodman represents the entirety of what the hearing officer based his decision upholding
the legal cause for the stop. Findings of Fact, l. l 0. The decision by the hearing officer that any
inquiry into personnel matters is not relevant is clearly erroneous, and thus the ruling of the district
court affirming the hearing officer's order must be reversed.
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As such, the ruling of the Hearing Officer that any "personnel matters" were not relevant for
the ALS hearing is clearly erroneous and the accompanying order must be reversed.
In its responsive brief, !TD argues that Mr. Paradis has not offered a showing as to why
Deputy Hoodman's prior work history is relevant here. Respondent's Brief p. 18. At the time of the
hearing, counsel for Mr. Paradis specifically stated that it was relevant for credibility in that ifhe was
released from his previous employment as a law enforcement officer for untruthfulness, or doctoring
DUI stops, it would certainly be relevant as to Deputy Hoodman's credibility. Tr. ALS p. 34 LL. 3-5.
C.

The District Court Erred In Affirmimi The Order of The Hearing Officer Because
The Hearing Officer's Determination Violated Mr. Paradis' Procedural Due Process
Rights.

!TD' s responsive brief states that Mr. Paradis does not indicate how his rights of due process
were in anyway violated by the Hearing Officer's determinations. Respondent's Briefp. 18.
Courts must consider the three Mathews factors in procedural due process challenges:
[F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 33(1976).
In analyzing the lvfathews factors, we must first look to the private interest that will be
affected by the agency action. Id. Here, a driver has a substantial interest in maintaining his driver's
license. Stale v. Ankney, 109 Idaho I, 4, 704 P.2d 333, 336 (1985). This substantial interest is
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increased for Mr. Paradis as the suspension of his driver's license will also restrict his CDL license
impairing his ability to work.
Second, we must look to the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards.
Here, there is a substantial likelihood ofan erroneous deprivation of Mr. Paradis' substantial interest
in his driver's license. By refusing to allow Mr. Paradis to adequately assess Deputy Hoodman's
credibility for hearing officer, Mr. Paradis was not allowed to adequately present one of only five
defenses provided at an ALS hearing: that there was no legal cause for the stop. J.C. § I 8-8002A(7).
As stated previously, the credibility of all witnesses in this case is of the utmost importance
as there is no observable physical evidence of the alleged traffic infraction. The hearing officer was
presented with testimony from Mr. and Mrs. Paradis, and conflicting testimony of Deputy Hoodman.
Findings of Fact, 1.10. If Deputy Hoodman is proven to not be a credible witness, the legal cause for
the stop is tenuous at best, and the suspension of Mr. Paradis's license must be vacated. Here, the
additional procedural safeguard of permitting Mr. Paradis to adequately cross-examine Deputy
Hoodman would require little, if any, additional procedural safeguards while simultaneously
reducing the risk of an erroneous deprivation of Mr. Paradis's substantial interest in his driver's
license.
Finally, we look at the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. In

Gibbar, the court held that requiring the director of the state police's breath testing program to come
testify at an administrative hearing would be overly burdensome in relation to the interest of the
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driver's interest in their driver's license. Gibbar, 143 Idaho at 947(Ct. App. 2006). However, the
court still held that Gibbar still should have been able to present his own expert testimony in lieu
of the requirement for the director's presence. Id.
Here, there is no fiscal or administrative burdens that the proposed additional requirements
would entail. It would simply allow the accused to conduct an adequate cross-examination related
to one of only five defenses permitted at an ALS hearing.
As such, the Hearing Officer's refusal to allow Paradis an adequate opportunity to crossexamine Deputy Hoodman's credibility was a violation of Mr. Paradis' due process rights and the
ruling of the district court affirming the ALS order must be reversed and remanded.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Petitioner-Appellant Mark Paradis, again respectfully requests
that this Court reverse the findings of the Hearing Officer and remand the matter back to ITO with
instructions to vacate the suspension of Mr. Paradis's driving privileges.
Respectfully submitted this
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(~ay of October, 20 I 7.
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,

PAUL''
Attorneys for Appellant.
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